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ABSTRACT This paper explains the persistence of a tax system characterised by low revenue collection and
extensive informality in Bangladesh. It combines analysis of long-term formal and informal institutions and of
micro-level incentives shaping negotiation of short-term reform. The system is unusually informal, discretionary,
and corrupt, but remains resistant to change because it delivers low and predictable tax rates to business,
extensive opportunities for corruption to the tax administration, and an important vehicle for fundraising by
political leaders and rent distribution to their elite supporters. We then explore the dynamics of micro-level reform
and external pressure within the constraints of this overarching political bargain.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increased recognition of the centrality of politics to tax reform in developing
countries. However, this research has continued to be characterised by two very different analytical
approaches. One approach, growing out of the traditions of historical institutionalism and fiscal sociology,
has sought to explain comparative tax outcomes over the long term by focusing on lasting formal and
informal institutions that reflect broader political settlements among competing elite groups (Lieberman,
2003; Schneider, 2012). The alternative approach has focused more narrowly on individual reform episodes,
focusing on the incentives facing competing interest groups and the efforts of reformists to overcome
entrenched opposition (Bates, 1989; Fairfield, 2010, 2013). In this paper, we seek to bridge these two
traditions, arguing that tax reform needs to be understood as a product of both longterm formal and informal
institutional arrangements and short-term negotiation between competing interest groups (Bates, 2010).
We focus on the experience of the domestic tax system in Bangladesh, as it presents a particularly
interesting case study owing to the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory realities. On one hand,
the domestic tax system in Bangladesh is, by conventional measures, among the least effective tax
systems in the world, characterised by manual administration, low revenue, and high levels of
discretion and corruption. On the other hand, despite the appearance of significant dysfunction,
economic growth has been consistently positive, while high profile tax reform efforts have faced
almost across-the-board resistance from political, economic, and administrative elites. Although the
co-existence of poor performance and resistance to reform is common in lower-income countries, the
depth of the apparent dysfunction and the strength of resistance to reform are comparatively striking.
The explanation, we argue, lies in durable informal institutions, norms, and networks – sometimes
referred to as a ‘political settlement’ – that ensure that despite extremely high levels of informality,
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discretion, and corruption, the tax system has managed to provide generally low and reasonably
predictable tax rates to key economic actors, while serving as a valuable conduit for targeted rent-
seeking and patronage politics.
In constructing this argument, we draw on extensive and in-depth interviews conducted over more
than a year. The goal of these interviews was highly targeted: to foster close and open relationships
with a reasonably representative group of key informants, who were very senior, had direct access to
key information, and were willing to have repeated and in-depth discussions with us about the
functioning of the system. It is our success in gaining in-depth access to these high-ranking officials
and prominent business representatives that has been critical to our findings. The identities of
individual respondents have been kept anonymous owing to concerns expressed by respondents, and
they are thus summarised here. From among businesses, our key informants have included the owners
and/or financial managers of nine local firms, spilt evenly between the service and manufacturing
sectors, and across business activities within each, all of which were willing to offer an in-depth view
of their tax experiences and practices.1 This has been complemented by engagement with three
executive committee members from the shop owners’ association, in order to gain insight into the
experiences of SMEs, as well as three senior tax lawyers and one independent private auditor, who
have offered an independent perspective on the tax practices of firms. These interviews have been
complemented by detailed interviews with the very highest levels of the national tax agency, including
three former Chairmen, one current member of the executive board, and two former and one current
Commissioners of taxes. We similarly enjoyed direct access to a variety of donor officials from the
IMF and World Bank, who have figured prominently in the reform efforts described here, as well as
intensive interaction with leading national academics.2 While these in-depth relationships represent the
core sources of information, a wide range of complementary, but less in-depth, interviews have also
been conducted with a wider range of government officials (both from the tax agency and ministry of
finance), businesses (particularly in the ready-made garments, poultry and wholesale sectors) and
business associations. This included presentation of preliminary findings on the informal realities of
tax payments to a workshop of senior tax and finance officials, which offered broad validation for core
key empirical claims of the paper.3
Drawing on this evidence, we begin by describing key features of the overarching bargain between
elite groups that has shaped the content and evolution of the tax system. However, we stress that while
it has been highly resilient to change, it has not been static. The formal and informal rules have been
consistently contested and re-negotiated, with the informal underpinnings of the system challenged by
external and domestic pressures. In order to illustrate these micro-political processes we provide a
detailed account of repeated efforts to reform the VAT, which offer a particularly clear view of the
agency of competing groups in both sustaining and reshaping key features of the prevailing tax
bargain. Specifically, our examination of these reform initiatives reveals four broad messages: first,
and most obviously, despite the technocratic overtones of reform efforts, reform outcomes have
overwhelmingly reflected political incentives. Second, while these reform processes appear both
lacking in coherence and to have fallen short of their goals, they are best understood as efforts by
elite groups to renegotiate existing relationships while drawing on and sustaining key elements of the
underlying political bargain. Third, both external and internal pressures have played a critical role in
destabilising existing bargains, and opening the door to incremental reform. And, finally, the very
informality that underpins the system implies the potential for a more fundamental destabilisation of
existing informal rules of the game – though the current system has remained remarkably resilient to
date.
These findings relate closely to a broader literature interested in the so-called ‘paradox of
Bangladesh’ – the coexistence of high levels of economic growth with seemingly very weak govern-
ance (Mahmud, Ahmed, & Mahajan, 2008; World Bank, 2007, 2010).4 This literature has proposed
that the explanation for this paradox lies in the existence of a ‘political settlement’ that is characterised
by intense partisan competition, high levels of corruption, and extensive patronage networks, but
which is equally built on informal norms and networks that have ensured predictability and profit-
ability for leading sectors (Ahmed, Greenleaf, & Sacks, 2013; Hassan, 2013; Khan, 2008a, 2010,
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2013). This study provides a detailed empirical account of precisely these types of dynamics within the
realm of taxation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five parts. The first section reviews the existing literature.
Section two presents an overview of key features of the tax system in Bangladesh. Section three
describes key elements of the political settlement that has underpinned the tax system. Having painted
this broader picture, section four then seeks to illustrate the micro-politics of reform through a detailed
analysis of two critical, and closely related, instances of reform: the original introduction of a value-
added tax in 1991 and efforts initiated in 2009 to reform the original law. Finally, section five
concludes.
2 Political Settlements and the Micro-Politics of Reform
Most research exploring the political economy of tax reform has focused on the micro-politics of tax
reform, conceptualising the challenge of reform in terms of the need to mobilise political forces in
favour or reform, while weakening opposition. At the core of this research is an expectation that
reform of tax policy and administration will be politically difficult: those who are threatened by tax
reform (‘the losers’) are generally more concentrated, organised, and politically influential than the
broad groups that stand to benefit most from expanded public spending (Ascher, 1984, 1989; Bates,
1989; Fairfield, 2010, 2013).
Research has focused in particular on resistance from two sources: business taxpayers and the tax
administration itself. Among the former, most focus has been on the collective action potential of
larger businesses, which may also enjoy personal ties to the political and administrative leadership
(Bird, 1992; Elizondo, 1994; Fairfield, 2013; Quinn & Shapiro, 1991). More recently, research has
noted the potential for well-organised small businesses and shop owners to become mobilised in
response to certain types of reform (Prichard, 2009, 2010). Meanwhile, growing attention has been
paid to resistance by tax administrators with vested interests in defending existing ways of doing
business, patronage networks, and areas of authority and autonomy (Devas, Delay, & Hubbard, 2001;
Fjeldstad, 2003, 2006; Joshi, Prichard, & Heady, 2012; Prichard, 2009; Varsano, 2003). As with other
areas of civil service reform, administrators may be able to undermine reform through both overt
resistance and through non-cooperation with implementation (Grindle & Thomas, 1991).
Given the expected strength of resistance, the core message from this literature is the paramount
importance of high-level political and administrative leadership, and of strategies for overcoming
resistance from vested interests (Ascher, 1989; Bird, 2008; Durand & Thorp, 1998; Elizondo, 1994;
Fairfield, 2010; Fjeldstad, 2006; Harberger, 1989; IMF, 2011; Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Shah, 1991;
Morrissey, 1995). In turn, research has long suggested that fiscal crises and moments of political
transition can be critical to opening new opportunities for reform, as they can serve to strengthen
support for reform while disrupting existing networks of resistance (Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008; Keen &
Lockwood, 2010; Mahon, 2004; Sanchez, 2006). As importantly, international pressure and support –
most often from the IMF – has often been an important driver of at least superficial reform (Fjeldstad
& Moore, 2008; Keen & Lockwood, 2010; Mahon, 2004; Prichard, Brun, & Morrissey, 2011;
Sanchez, 2006).
However, while these studies offer a clear understanding of key actors and their narrow interests,
they may fail to adequately capture the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping the
durability of key features of tax systems. With this in mind, a relatively distinct literature has focused
not on the micro-politics of specific reform episodes, but on the long-term characteristics of tax
systems, rooted in slow-changing institutions and political bargains among elites (Di John, 2010;
Lieberman, 2003; Lledo, Moore, & Schneider, 2004; Luong & Weinthal, 2004; Martin, Mehrotra, &
Prasad, 2009; Melo, 2007; Schneider, 2012; Tilly, 1992). This approach is closely related to the
broader work of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), who argue that development outcomes are rooted
in formal and informal institutions, which are best understood as the outcomes of implicit and explicit
bargains among competing elites. As Khan (2010) explains, these bargains ensure that ‘the distribution
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of benefits is consistent with the distribution of power in society’, and thus provide a framework for
maintaining stability (p. 18).5 More simply, this literature suggests that understanding tax outcomes
requires a focus not primarily on short-term interest group competition, but on the role of formal and
informal institutions and the broader bargains, norms, and networks governing elite interactions
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).
Recent scholarship has increasingly adopted the concept of a ‘social order’ or ‘political settlement’
to describe these durable and comparatively institutionalised bargains and norms governing the
distribution of rents among elite groups. However, while this language has usefully drawn attention
to the strength and persistence of informal ‘rules of the game’, this literature has also been accused of
sometimes implying a misleading degree of permanence and institutionalisation, while obfuscating the
role of agency in continuously re-shaping the existing rules of the game.6 With this risk in mind, this
paper draws on a smaller branch of recent research on ‘political settlements’ that has sought to
consciously combine an analysis of long-lived institutions and political bargains with a focus on the
micro-level politics surrounding specific reforms (Khan, 2013).7 While this approach has deep roots in
the history of political economy research, this merging of micro and macro analysis has been largely
and surprisingly absent from existing studies of tax reform, and thus offers a more complete under-
standing of the experience in Bangladesh and a possible framework for future tax research.
3 Tax Reform and the Tax System in Bangladesh
Bangladesh presents a fascinating case in which to explore the political economy of taxation. In its
broad characteristics, the tax system in Bangladesh resembles those of most other developing
countries: administration is led by the National Board of Revenue (NBR), which is divided into
three divisions: Direct Tax, VAT, and Customs. Like most lower-income countries, a significant share
of revenue is collected at the border (37% in 2009–2010), while domestic taxes are primarily from the
VAT (35%) and income taxes (28%), of which taxes on corporate profits are the most important
element (Ahmed, 2011).
However, despite a formal structure similar to most lower-income countries, overall performance
has lagged behind. Total revenue collection achieved meaningful gains from 2007 through 2011,
reaching 10.4 per cent of GDP before plateauing in subsequent years. However, this total still lags well
behind neighbouring countries, as well as many lower-income countries in Africa.8 More striking has
been the slow pace of policy and administrative reform, as the domestic tax system overall continues
to be characterised by a weak policy framework, very limited administrative modernisation, a high
degree of administrative fragmentation, significant human resource constraints, and weak enforcement
mechanisms. While a range of incremental reforms have been introduced in recent years (discussed
below) – and are felt to have contributed to the uptick in revenue – they have changed the systems
largely at the margins. Meanwhile, broad weaknesses have persisted despite a regular procession of
internationally-sponsored reform initiatives, and during a period in which more significant reform has
taken root across much of the developing world (Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008).
The most basic challenge has been the continuing weakness of the overall policy framework, which,
despite modest recent progress, continues to be characterised by an enormous range of exemptions,
incentives, and special regimes. These range from the existence of simplified VAT regimes to
significant scope within the law for tax officials and political elites to grant comparatively
discretionary benefits.9 This directly undermines revenue collection, but equally complicates admin-
istration, undermines equity in the system, and introduces significant scope for officials to exercise
discretion in both policy and administration.
This space for discretion within the law is closely linked to the broader challenge of very limited
administrative modernisation. Most tax systems in lower-income countries have sought to progres-
sively increase reliance on self-reported tax returns, voluntary compliance, and risk based auditing,
with at least some success. By contrast, and despite modest recent progress, NBR has largely
maintained an outdated ‘control’ based system, which relies on the physical monitoring of taxpayers
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in order to enforce compliance. This is reflected, among other things, in extremely low levels of
automation, and has allowed NBR officials to retain substantial discretion and thus, opportunities for
collusion with, or extraction from, taxpayers.
This basic inefficiency of the system has been exacerbated by a high degree of administrative
fragmentation. Whereas there has been a trend across lower-income countries toward greater integra-
tion across administrative units, the NBR remains divided into three highly autonomous divisions:
Direct Tax, VAT, and Customs. The relative absence of data sharing across departments severely
undermines administration and opens space for collusion, arbitrariness, and abuse, while fragmentation
also creates additional costs for taxpayers.
These challenges have been underpinned by significant human resource constraints within the
NBR. Hiring is subject to the common constraints of civil service recruitment through the Public
Service Commission, making the hiring of staff with the specialised skills necessary for modern tax
administration particularly challenging. This is in contrast to the trend towards semi-autonomous
revenue authorities, with greater flexibility over hiring decisions, elsewhere in the developing world
(Devas et al., 2001; Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008; Kloeden, 2011). This has been exacerbated by a highly
politicised legal battle, with unresolved court injunctions sharply constraining hiring to the VAT and
customs departments from the early 1980s until 2011. This resulted in only slightly more than half of
nearly 5000 allocated positions being filled as recently as 2008, while poorly qualified staff have been
promoted to senior positions in the absence of new hiring.
Finally, even when tax assessments have been effective, enforcement mechanisms have been weak.
This has in part reflected the ability of large taxpayers to use political influence, but has also resulted
from dysfunction within the judicial system. Lower levels of the appeals process are characterised by
widespread corruption and potential for abuse, while cases that escalate to the high court are subject to
high costs and processing delays lasting several years or longer. The latter has offered an informal
means to delay or avoid tax payments, as no taxes are collected while cases are pending – and it was
only in 2011 that the government began to take even modest steps to ease these major delays and
revenue losses.10
The end result of these weaknesses is a tax system characterised by extremely high degrees of
informality, widespread discretion, and the regular negotiation of tax liabilities. While large businesses
submit tax returns to the government, they are emphatic that these tax returns represent merely a
starting point for subsequent ‘negotiations’ with tax officials. Over time, most firms accept this reality
and enter into implicit agreements with tax officials that involve regular informal payments and
informal negotiation of liabilities between tax officials, lawyers, and auditors, sometimes collectively
referred to as the ‘trinity’ or ‘tri-party syndicate’. These agreements are periodically destabilised,
particularly when officials are re-assigned, thus initiating new rounds of negotiation around tax
liabilities and informal payments. During these ‘transitions’ conflict is more likely, with tax collectors
sometimes making larger demands for informal payments, and taxpayers in turn drawing on political
patrons or the threat of court challenges to minimise those demands. This basic pattern is repeated for
smaller firms, though on a much more constant basis, owing to regular interaction between tax
collectors and firms within the manual, control based system of administration. Put most simply, it
is a system with an unusually expansive scope for politicisation, collusion, and corruption.
While these limitations of the existing system are significant, they have also long been recognised.
What is thus most remarkable about the domestic tax system is its resistance to fundamental change
despite almost continuous reform efforts. The past two decades have witnessed a progression of
externally supported reform programmes,11 with donor pressure becoming more strident since 2009
owing to mounting concerns with fiscal management in the country. However, while these reform
measures have yielded the successful implementation of a wide range of comparatively modest,
incremental reform measures, they have generally failed to fully achieve their more ambitious goals
or transform deeper weaknesses of the existing system.
This is not to entirely discount existing reform efforts. In recent years the NBR has, among other
improvements, introduced taxpayer identification numbers, expanded online tax filing, introduced
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for tax disputes, and expanded the tax net for small firms
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through innovative measures like tax fairs. Meanwhile tax revenue has increased from 8 per cent of
GDP in 2007 to 10.4 per cent of GDP in 2011. Many senior officials within the tax agency believe that
these incremental reforms have played an important role in driving these broader revenue gains.
However, while these incremental gains are noteworthy, the broader reality of the reform process is
quite different: incremental reform has generally been achieved where it has not threatened the
incentives of leading groups, but more fundamental changes have faced steadfast resistance. The
result is that, despite marginal gains, the system has remained plagued by the same fundamental
weaknesses, noted above, for decades. This is reflected in total revenue figures: while there was a
noticeable increase in collection from 2007 to 2011, these gains were from an extremely low base,
while revenue collection subsequently stagnated – and fell short of government targets – from 2012 to
2014.
Illustratively, donor demands since 2009 have focused on the implementation of a major VAT
reform – as the original VAT had become littered with exceptions and exemptions since its imple-
mentation in 1991 – with a secondary focus on reform of the Income Tax Act, which had not been
reformed since 1984. Critically, these demands for reform have been backed by their inclusion as
increasingly assertive formal conditionality for new IMF lending. However, despite repeated govern-
ment promises to introduce sweeping new VAT and income tax legislation, the reality of these
ambitious reforms has been far more convoluted, characterised by delays, policy reversals, and
continuous negotiation as the government has sought to secure the release of IMF funds while
minimising the extent of actual reform. What follows correspondingly aims to explain the strength
and character of this continued resistance to reform by looking first at the broad political bargain
underpinning the domestic tax system and then turning attention to the details of VAT reform efforts.
4 Informal Institutions and the Political Logic of the Tax System
While resistance to tax reform is a common feature of the policy landscape in lower-income countries,
the unusual persistence and strength of resistance in Bangladesh is striking. Not only does the existing
tax system fail to generate significant revenue for the government, but extremely high levels of
corruption and discretion within the system appear anathema to the desire amongst businesses for
predictability and low rates. However, despite these apparent drawbacks, leading politicians, busi-
nesses, and administrators have vigorously defended key features of the tax system – though often
behind closed doors.
Understanding the persistence of this seemingly dysfunctional system demands going beyond the
formal features of the system and the formal interests of individual actors. Instead, a full explanation
lies in the informal rules, norms, and networks that have shaped de facto outcomes and made the
existing system mutually beneficial to powerful political, economic, and administrative actors. What
follows briefly describes the interests of administrators, businesses, and politicians, before highlighting
the ways in which their interests are interconnected within the existing system.
4.1 Bureaucratic Resistance, Rigidity and Politicisation
At a broad level, the NBR itself has been the most steadfast actor resistant to reform. Under the status
quo, NBR officials enjoy a large degree of autonomy and substantial discretionary power. This opens
the door to systemic corruption that is organised and sanctioned at every level of the administration.12
As such, many within the NBR are strongly resistant to any reform programme that would reduce their
autonomy and discretionary power, including through increased transparency. The strength of bureau-
cratic resistance is consistent with patterns elsewhere in the civil service (Huque & Rahman, 2003).
However, resistance to reform is not uniform. The senior leadership, made up of the appointed
chairman and board members, has traditionally been comparatively reformist in their orientation, as
the public face of the agency. However, despite occupying nominally powerful positions, these senior
officials have lacked sufficient authority in practice to lead genuine reform.13 By contrast, the senior
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levels of the front line administration are widely viewed as being aligned against reform, with deputy
commissioners the centre of day-to-day networks of corruption and commissioners overseeing these
activities. These actors are able to exercise significant influence over de facto administrative perfor-
mance, and thus over de facto support for, or resistance to, reform. Finally, the rank-and-file of the
NBR are the front line of networks of corruption and informal bargaining. As in other developing
countries, resistance at this level has been aimed at preventing redundancy, limiting new hiring and
skills requirements, and blocking the implementation of effective performance monitoring systems
(Devas et al., 2001; Fjeldstad, 2006; Therkildsen, 2004).
4.2 Business Resistance and Reform
The most important resistance to reform has come from the business community, which has at
various times been explicitly cited by the government, both publicly and privately, as the reason for
altering or abandoning reform initiatives.14 Business associations, led by the Federation of Business
Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI), have publicly expressed support for reform
focused on simplifying procedures, establishing non-governmental dispute resolution processes,
and reducing some of the discretionary power exercised by tax officials. However, behind closed
doors, powerful firms and industry associations have been far more resistant, fearing that any
reform may threaten the significant array of exemptions, special regimes and informal benefits that
they currently enjoy.15
Larger firms have traditionally been most concerned with defending existing incentives, exemp-
tions, and special regimes in the VAT and income tax laws, as well as informal practices that allow for
corruption and collusion in reducing the effective tax burden. Their lobbying has been grounded in
financial support for both leading parties, and in close relationships between political and economic
elites.16 By partial contrast, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been more consistently
mobilised in opposition to the VAT, out of a fear of stronger enforcement and increased compliance
costs. This reflects their small size and frequent informality, and has resulted in success in pushing for
retention of a widely applied presumptive tax regime for small firms. Unlike larger firms, their
political influence is grounded in their national organisation and potential for disruptive collective
action.
4.3 Political Elites, Informal Networks and the Prevailing Equilibrium
The story told thus far resembles standard explanations of the difficulty of tax reform: entrenched and
unified resistance among administrators and business taxpayers has made reform politically untenable.
However, on closer inspection this simple story quickly proves incomplete. For one part, it fails to
adequately account for the absence of greater business support for reform despite the pervasiveness of
informality, discretion, and corruption, all of which are generally cited as barriers to doing business.
Equally, it fails to adequately explain the absence of more concerted political leadership for reform
despite very limited public revenue, fiscal deficits, and consistent external pressure for reform. It is
therefore necessary to move beyond an atomistic account of individual interest groups in order to
capture the interconnectedness of elite interests and the informal norms and networks that have
ensured shared benefits from the existing system.
4.3.1 Informality, predictability and political neutrality: business and the existing settlement. While
firms stand to benefit from collusion with tax officials to lower tax liabilities, the informality of the
existing system also exposes them to significant risk. This includes periodic harassment and extraction
by administrators, and the risk that political elites may exploit the informality of the existing system to
benefit political allies and attack rivals.17 Given highly charged partisan political competition,
Bangladesh’s tax system appears on the surface to be well beyond the point at which the potential
benefits of collusion should be outweighed by the costs of additional uncertainty – and at which we
would expect to see business support for reform.
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Why then, has there not been such support? While corruption is extremely widespread, it has also
been unexpectedly predictable, kept within manageable bounds, and relatively free of the effects of
partisan political competition. This predictability is critical, as it allows firms to treat corruption simply
as an additional cost of doing business, without the negative implications for growth that arise from
more decentralised corruption (Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Wedeman, 1997; Wei, 2000). With
the potential costs associated with corruption and informality thus minimised, leading firms have
concluded that these costs are outweighed by the benefits of artificially low effective rates through
collusion, thus making the status quo relatively desirable.
The greater mystery lies in understanding how and why this predictability has been maintained
despite the potential for politicisation and abuse. Bangladesh has long been home to highly adversarial
partisan political competition and widespread bureaucratic rent-seeking. Intuitively, this would seem to
virtually guarantee that the tax system would be deployed for partisan purposes, or minimally that
corruption would become unpredictable and extremely burdensome for businesses.
Why has this not been the case in practice? Part of the answer lies in the existence of strong
informal norms and networks governing tax administration. At the level of day-to-day operations,
corruption and negotiation are subject to relatively centralised oversight by deputy commissioners and
commissioners, thus serving to discipline and regularise front line practices. This centralisation is
critical, as it shifts the analytical lens from decentralised and unpredictable corruption to hierarchically
organised informal networks managing rents within the NBR.
However, the more important answer lies in the motivations of the political leadership. While
Bangladesh is home to highly adversarial partisan political competition, both political parties have
informally agreed that the search for political rents should not impinge on the primacy of supporting
continued economic growth, and the creation of economic rents for key actors in the private sector.
Despite highly antagonistic political competition, there is a strong commitment to rent sharing in the
economic sphere, with continued economic growth serving to expand the size of the economic pie and
to defend the entrenched position of the two leading political parties (Hassan, 2013; Khan, 2010,
2011). Consistent with this logic, most firms maintain good relationships with both leading political
parties, including making financial contributions to both sides. The same ethos of equitable rent
sharing is apparent among senior tax officials who explain that it would be ‘unfair’ to aggressively
target particular firms, as this would destroy its prospects relative to its competitors. More simply, at
all levels it is understood that rent-seeking and partisan advantage can be pursued at the margin, but
must be moderated in order to support continued economic growth.
4.3.2 Rent allocation, economic growth and political patronage: political elites and the existing
settlement. The second mystery is the absence of a stronger push for reform by the political leader-
ship despite extremely low levels of revenue collection with which to finance government programmes
and patronage networks. On one hand, parts of the political leadership have demonstrated a genuine
desire for reform and have, at times, taken concrete steps to pursue that goal.18 However, political
leaders are not only constrained by the strength of organised resistance but have come to benefit
directly from the existing tax system. The informality of the system allows it to serve an important
political function as a conduit for distributing patronage, as a source of funding for the political
leadership, and as a means to preserve and support continued economic growth. On balance this
combination of political constraints and political benefits has outweighed the desire for reform, as
leaders have opted for the certainty of the current system rather than the uncertainty of change.
To understand this calculus, it is necessary to understand informal links between the political elite,
the tax administration, and business leaders. While the tax administration is formally home to four
civil service associations,19 they have been progressively superseded by informal groups that cut
across hierarchy, cadre, and political party. These informal groups have enjoyed high level political
support – reaching as high as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) – which has allowed them to wield
increasing power over hiring and promotion decisions, and in turn, to further solidify their powerful
position.20 These groups have been essentially non-partisan, with changes in political leadership
generally leading to changes in the leadership of these informal networks, but not to broader changes
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in their role and organisation. Instead, they have been defined by their centralised control of patronage
and corruption networks, and consequent ability to efficiently distribute financial and professional
rewards. The overall administrative environment has thus been one in which the de jure roles and
responsibilities of officials have been largely supplanted by de facto power and authority. These
informal networks have used this de facto authority to generate regular funds for political elites, while
allowing political leaders to dispense patronage and rents to leading economic actors – thus ensuring
continued support from political actors reaching up to the PMO.
The ability of the political leadership to deploy the NBR to deliver patronage to business allies has
been important to strengthening informal ties linking political elites to leaders within the business
community. As noted above, while leading businesses may have closer ties to one or the other of the
leading political parties, they have generally offered political and financial support across partisan
lines. Rather than competing primarily to elect one or the other political party to power, large
businesses have had a primary interest in the continuation of the broader status quo. Within this status
quo each political party has delivered special benefits to its closest allies, but not exclusively, as they
have been equally committed to maintaining a foundation of support to leading firms and sectors
across the partisan divide, in an effort to sustain high levels of economic growth. The ability of
political elites to exercise informal influence over senior officials within the NBR has been critical to
this relationship, as the tax system has been an important conduit for delivering economic benefits, and
retaining large business support.
On the surface, a rules-based system with uniformly low tax rates could achieve the same economic
objectives as the current system, while raising additional revenue and significantly reducing inform-
ality and uncertainty. However, this fails to recognise the broader political role of the existing system.
The existing system offers the political leadership control over the distribution of patronage and
economic rents through the tax system. This has been a key source of direct and indirect political
financing: leading businesses have incentives to offer political support and financing that cuts across
partisan lines, while central control of networks of corruption within the NBR has made the tax system
an important conduit for political financing. Meanwhile, businesses continue to benefit from lower tax
rates through corruption and collusion – along with an assurance that politically motivated tax
demands will be kept within manageable bounds – while the tax administration benefits from bribes
and from continued autonomy and discretion.
While the benefits of the system are thus clear, it is essential to recognise the informal – and
potentially fragile – basis for its continuation. At the core of current arrangements is an apparent
contradiction: the system promises low and predictable rates to key business actors through collusion
and corruption, while also offering significant discretion and rent-seeking opportunities to tax officials
and political actors. The challenge thus lies in finding a sustainable balance between the seemingly
contradictory need for predictability for businesses on one hand and the need for discretion for the
state and government on the other.
Finding this balance is inherently complex, as the discretion enjoyed by state and political leaders
holds a constant risk: that those actors may abuse their discretion in pursuit of short-term gains, but at
the expense of the interests of other groups and the long-term bargain. To date, this temptation has
largely been kept in check. Political leaders from both political parties have benefitted their allies at the
margin, but have not employed the system as a weapon against opponents. Tax administrators have
sought to maximise their benefits, but without fundamentally jeopardising competition among firms –
in part because businesses have retained the ability to turn to the courts, or political leaders, in cases of
perceived abuse. And, finally, businesses have gained enough from lower rates, and the general
predictability of the system, to be willing to tolerate moderate levels of uncertainty and rent-seeking.
That said, it is not difficult to see the risks inherent in a system that relies on informal under-
standings among actors with potentially contradictory short-term interests. And, indeed, most actors
view the current system as imperfect in at least some respects. However, it is a compromise that has
minimally delivered both economic growth and relative political stability. As such, both political and
economic elites appear to prefer the imperfect system that they know to the uncertainty, in terms of tax
burdens and political alignment, implied by deeper reform. This is consistent with Ascher’s (1989)
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observation that, ‘the frequently negative “reflex” reaction to a new tax reform initiative on the part of
many groups is typically due not just to expected losses but also to the risk of incurring costs that
cannot be anticipated’ (p. 464).
5 Negotiating Reform: The Case of VAT Reform Efforts
The description so far captures the broad contours of the ‘political settlement’ governing the tax
system over several decades. However, while key features of the system have been long-lived, they
have not been static. Key features of the system have been regularly contested and re-negotiated, with
continuity maintained through the strategic choices of key actors. The remaining analysis seeks to
illustrate these micro-political processes through a focus on two prominent and related reform
episodes: the original introduction of the VAT in 1991, and subsequent efforts to reform the existing
VAT since 2009. The analysis aims particularly to highlight three elements not touched on by the
discussion so far. First, the important role of negotiations between domestic elites and international
actors in putting stress on existing informal arrangements. Second, the specific strategies adopted by
the government and other actors in negotiating incremental reform within the context of existing
informal rules, norms, and networks. Finally, the ways in which unexpected political events have
opened new spaces for reform by disrupting key features of the existing political bargain around
taxation.
5.1 The 1991 VAT Reform
The original introduction of the VAT was initiated in the late 1980s under the military government of
General Ershad, briefly derailed by the victory of the pro-democracy movement, and then quickly
revived by the democratically elected Bangaldesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (1991–1996). The reform
was undertaken in response to perilously low levels of revenue collection, and under pressure from the
IMF, which sought a highly simplified and uniform policy regime.
Drafting of the law was undertaken largely in secret, led by a Bangladeshi ex-IMF official, a small
group of officials from the Ministry of Finance, and limited business representation. As such, most
businesses and members of the NBR only became aware of the proposed reform when the draft law
was rapidly prepared for implementation and placed before Parliament. Consistent with government
fears, significant resistance immediately emerged from both businesses and the NBR, with the
opposition Awami League threatening hartal (general shutdown) unless the VAT law was abolished.
The government responded by seeking a strategy that could simultaneously satisfy powerful local
constituencies as well as IMF demands for reform. It was able to do so by drawing on both formal and
informal bargains with key stakeholders. The Awami League was persuaded to quiet its opposition
after significant lobbying by the reform leadership, the World Bank, and IMF. It feared being branded
irresponsible and ‘anti-market’, while, more tellingly, this compromise was an early example of
aggressive partisan political competition being moderated in order to manage key areas of economic
regulation. Meanwhile, the political leadership relied on its clientelistic relationship with the leadership
of the FBCCI in order to solicit a formal statement of support. Informal norms and networks were
critical, as large businesses were persuaded that their interests would be protected following reform,
whether formally or informally.
The government subsequently pursued more explicit compromises in order to address persistent
resistance from smaller businesses and front line NBR officials. Small and medium businesses,
particularly in the wholesale and retail sectors, were placated with the introduction of the so-called
‘package system’ – a simplified tax regime that would effectively guarantee lower taxes and expanded
scope for negotiation with tax officials. Meanwhile, NBR officials were granted various concessions
allowing them to retain a degree of discretion and control through, for example, continued require-
ments that prices used in calculating VAT liabilities be approved by tax officials. Critically, NBR
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officials successfully resisted efforts aimed at re-organising or modernising the administration by
drawing on their high level political patrons to defend the administrative status quo.
However, the most important compromise lay in an agreement to implement the 1991 reform
gradually, and with a multiplicity of rates and special regimes. This stands in sharp contrast to the
majority of lower-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where VATs have been
implemented comparatively rapidly and with fewer exceptions.21 The new VAT was initially applied
to only large manufacturing and export industries, both of which were large enough to cope with
reporting requirements and had limited liabilities owing to the export of most of their production.
Subsequent expansion of VAT coverage was consistently delayed, while the government continued to
maintain, and selectively add, special regimes and exemptions. Despite constant pressure from the
IMF and World Bank, it was 2004 before VAT coverage had been expanded to all major sectors, while
by that time the range of exemptions and discretion that had been added to the law left it resembling
the initially envisioned VAT in name only.
This reliance on incremental reform was a strategy to reconcile competing interests by relying on
informal understandings and implicit agreements. Delayed implementation allowed the government to
get the law passed, and satisfy external actors, but businesses understood that this implied a longer
time horizon over which to continue to lobby for delays and exceptions. Put more simply, it created
opportunities for a divergence between de jure policy and de facto realities on the ground, both
through incomplete implementation and the gradual proliferation of exemptions. This compromise was
made possible by an implicit understanding among elites that core business interests would be
defended over time, particularly at the level of implementation. This implicit understanding was
made possible by the informal norms and networks that underpinned the broader tax system.
5.2 VAT Reform Effort Since 2009
Owing to the variety of exceptions and exemptions that came to characterise the 1991 VAT law, it
failed to achieve either the revenue productivity or the economic efficiency that had motivated its
introduction. The result was mounting international pressure to introduce a new law, free of many of
the existing compromises. As fiscal pressures facing the country mounted, these demands for reform
culminated in the IMF making the introduction of a new VAT law a prominent condition for the
negotiation of a new US$1 billion loan.
The new reform process was initiated by the Ministry of Finance in 2009, and saw the government
seek to satisfy competing demands by employing many of the same strategies employed during the
previous VAT reform process. The initial drafting of the law was again undertaken in relative secrecy,
led by the same ex-IMF local expert who had led the drafting of the 1991 VAT law. The government
promised throughout that the new VAT law would be passed as part of the 2012 budget process, and
would then be followed by a revised income tax law the following year aimed at reducing and
rationalising tax exemptions.
As in 1991, the draft law quickly elicited major resistance when it was finally opened to public
scrutiny. The most vocal resistance again came from SMEs and NBR officials, both of whom cited
capacity constraints and a lack of consultation as their concerns. In practice, however, NBR officials
were again primarily concerned with defending existing areas of discretion and control over hiring,
while SMEs were focused on preserving the highly advantageous ‘package system’ for small firms.
Resistance from large manufacturing firms was initially more muted, but large firms began to voice
stronger concerns when it became clear that the new laws – and particularly changes to the Income Tax
Law – might threaten existing exemptions and the scope for collusion with tax officials.
Confronted by this resistance, the government quickly withdrew the proposed VAT law
in May 2011, while allowing the income tax reform to gradually lose priority. This followed a
common trend in the government’s engagement with donors around tax reform, with promises made
but then repeatedly delayed, in an effort to maintain access to external funding. However, having
learned from previous reform failures, the IMF responded by redoubling their insistence that a new
loan agreement would not be concluded without progress on tax reform. Facing a growing liquidity
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crisis, the government revived reform plans and began the process of negotiating the formal and
informal compromises necessary to satisfy competing interest groups.
Over several months prior to March 2012, the revived VAT legislation was revised in an effort to
satisfy the IMF while including a range of concessions to key interest groups. This was aimed both at
offering formal policy concessions and at preserving key spaces for informality and discretion within
the law. The government agreed in negotiations with the wholesale and retail sectors not to eliminate
existing special regimes, and most notably the ‘package system’.22 In a similar concession to large
firms, the government conceded that firms above the threshold for VAT registration would have the
option of complying with the standard VAT system or of opting for a 5 per cent turnover tax – a
seemingly transparent hand-out to a subset of firms with more than adequate capacity for compliance.
The government likewise agreed to dramatically reduce the extent of sanctions for non-compliance, to
the point of inadequacy.
The largest concessions revolved around preserving administrative discretion for the NBR. Most
notably, the NBR was given power to introduce further VAT exemptions ‘in the public interest’ – an
amorphous concept open to significant collusion between tax officials and large businesses. In a
similar vein, the NBR Board was granted significant scope to interpret important policy and admin-
istrative aspects of the law internally, offering further scope for collusion and greater autonomy for the
NBR. A similar provision was put in place offering front-line tax officials the power to interpret key
legal provisions, rather than such interpretation being reserved for commissioners, thus offering
younger officers scope to develop ‘individual fiefdoms’. Finally, and in the same vein, the government
reintroduced rules mandating that firms retain extremely detailed operational information – including
product-specific input-output tables – which was widely viewed as offering officials opportunities to
extract informal payments.
By mid-2012, the government had thus sought to replicate the strategy employed in 1991, preparing
a VAT draft to satisfy external demands, while negotiating critical exemptions designed to defend key
features of the pre-existing system. This initially appeared to have been successful, as a US$987 mil-
lion loan from the IMF was finalised in April 2012, to be disbursed in nine tranches.23 However, at the
final moment, the IMF rejected the compromises embedded in the new draft Act.24 It presented the
government with an internal memo detailing issues that would need to be addressed if the second
tranche of the loan agreement was to be disbursed.25
With a continued urgent need for financing, the government quickly acquiesced to essentially all of
the IMF’s demands,26 while resorting to a strategy of incrementalism and informal agreements in an
effort to satisfy domestic constituencies. Mirroring the 1991 VAT law, the critical element of this
compromise was a decision to postpone implementation of the new Act until 2015, while postponing
changes to the special regimes for SMEs an additional three years, until 2018.27
Superficially, this simply represented an effort by the government to postpone the pain of reform
beyond elections scheduled for 2014. However, as with the reform programme in 1991, the decision to
postpone implementation held for businesses and NBR officials an implicit opportunity to gradually
chip away at the provisions of the Act – a process that was clearly in evidence by late 2014.28
Moreover, continued resistance to administrative modernisation, which had not been subject to such
strict conditionality, offered an alternative avenue to undermine implementation of the new Act – a fact
not lost on many inside and outside of the NBR. It is these implicit promises of continuity, made
possible by the informal norms and networks governing the tax system, that appear to have played a
major role in allowing superficial reform to move ahead. The extent to which meaningful reform will
actually be implemented in the future is therefore uncertain.
5.3 Common Strategies and Shifting Political Contexts
The most striking feature of these two reform episodes lies in the similarity between the compromises
underpinning the 1991 and 2012 VAT laws. In both cases the government sought to satisfy external
pressure through de jure policy reform, while retaining key formal and informal features of the pre-
existing system. It satisfied domestic constituencies by seeking to retain key areas of discretion and
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through a reliance on incremental reform, the latter relying on an implicit promise that postponing
reform would create space for carving out additional compromises in the future. These compromises
were made possible by the fact that they built on existing informal rules, norms, and networks, which
offered credible assurances of continuity despite seemingly significant policy reform. The strength of
these informal institutions is apparent in the slow pace of recent reform efforts despite a fiscal crisis
and consistently aggressive external pressure.
However, despite these similarities, the more recent reform has gone somewhat further than the
1991 reform, particularly in curbing the legal discretion exercised by NBR officials. This reflects the
growing assertiveness of more reformist elements of the political leadership, which has been grounded
in domestic and external developments, which have subtly shifted the political balance and opened the
door for the modest renegotiation of existing rules, both formal and informal.
One such shift in the political context has been the much greater insistence of the IMF during the
most recent reform episode. Whereas the IMF eventually accepted the significant exceptions and
delays associated with the 1991 VAT law, it was ultimately unwilling to make the same concessions in
2012. This has seemingly reflected two factors: lessons learned from the poor implementation of
previous reform programmes, and increased leverage as the fiscal crisis facing the government
deepened after 2008. While the limitations of conditionality in forcing meaningful reform are by
now well documented, this experience nonetheless appears to speak to the potential for committed
international actors to put stress on the existing bargain and open new space for reform.
This international pressure has been combined with more idiosyncratic, but no less important,
domestic political shifts. One element of this shift has been an unexpected decline in the power
wielded by informal networks of patronage and corruption within the NBR. These networks have
historically been stubbornly resistant to reform owing to support from the PMO. However, this
political balance was disrupted when their strongest ally within the PMO was abruptly removed
from his post in response to allegations of corruption in the procurement of infrastructure contracts.
This change empowered the comparatively reformist Minister of Finance. On the policy front, this
allowed the Minister to refuse NBR demands that they retain the right to approve prices used in
calculating tax liabilities – a provision long opposed by business, but jealously guarded by the NBR.
Less obviously, it opened space for the rationalisation of personnel decisions, with new hiring initiated
in 2012, followed by a major reshuffling of staff within the NBR in an effort to erode the power of
informal networks.29
The other domestic political shift has resulted from renewed discussion of the inherent vulnerability
of existing informal practices to politicisation along partisan lines. In recent years, there is increasing
evidence of the government occasionally using the tax system for partisan purposes in punishing
challengers to the existing balance of political authority.30 The message has rung clear: the tax system
will not be employed for partisan political purposes as long as competing elites do not overtly seek to
challenge the broader status quo, characterised by the dominance of existing political parties and
economic elites. Most elites have appeared relatively unconcerned by these developments, remaining
confident of the sanctity of the existing bargain as long as they abide by the established ‘rules of the
game’. However, these developments have nonetheless highlighted the inherent potential for politici-
sation offered by highly informal governance practices (Hassan, 2013; Khan, 2008b, 2013). While
these instances of politicisation have thus not prompted a major realignment of political interests in the
short-term, they do appear to have helped to open new space for gradual reform toward reducing
discretion in the system. More abstractly, these developments highlight the potential that any further
erosion of trust in the existing bargain among elites could lead to a much more dramatic realignment.
6 Conclusions
The persistent weakness of the tax system in Bangladesh is best understood as the product of well-
established informal rules, norms, and networks that have served the broader interests of political,
economic, and bureaucratic elites. This ‘political settlement’ has ensured predictably low rates and the
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strategic distribution of economic rents, despite the existence of widespread corruption, discretion, and
informality. However, this system has not been static. Repeated efforts to reform the VAT system –
driven to a significant extent by external pressure – have seen the government seek to re-negotiate
existing rules in ways that satisfy both external actors and key domestic constituencies. In doing so, it
has drawn on existing informal norms and networks in order to reconcile external pressure for de jure
policy reform with a desire to preserve key features of the existing system.
Individual reform episodes thus reveal significant continuity, but also highlight the potential for
changes in the alignment of power to open new reform opportunities. Growing assertiveness by the
IMF, the weakening of informal networks with the NBR, and growing concerns about the potential for
the system to be politicised have collectively opened new spaces for incremental reform. While these
reforms seem destined to be more limited than the ambitious plans laid out initially, the combination of
a new policy framework, the preliminary rationalisation of hiring within the NBR, and a series of more
modest reforms are indicative of the potential for reform within the context of a highly resilient elite
bargain. More broadly, these events highlight the ways in which the political environment for reform
can change in contingent and unpredictable ways and open unexpected spaces for reform, even where
existing practices are deeply entrenched (Haggard & Webb, 1993, p. 144).
Finally, while this paper has focused on the tax system, it has sought to illustrate the potential for
debates over taxation to act as a lens through which to understand broader political dynamics.
Significant recent research has focused on the so-called ‘paradox of Bangladesh’, with informal
institutions ensuring the predictable distribution of rents, relative political stability, and continued
economic growth despite high corruption and dysfunctional formal governance (Ahmed et al., 2013;
Hassan, 2013; Khan, 2013). This paper has provided a detailed view of the functioning of precisely
this type of dynamic in the governance of taxation, while highlighting the ways in which formal and
informal rules are negotiated and renegotiated in the face of domestic and external stresses.
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Notes
1. Specifically, in-depth interviews were conducted with firms from the following business activities. From manufacturing:
general manufacturing, ready-made garments, aluminium foil and shoes. From services: hotel owner, consulting, two
architecture firms and a supermarket owner.
2. These initial interviews were carried out as part of research supported by the World Bank in April–June 2011, with
subsequent interviews for this paper conducted periodically throughout 2011 and 2012 with the support of the International
Centre for Tax and Development.
3. Wherever possible the details of the account were confirmed through documentary evidence, but in practice access to
documentation – beyond public accounts in the news media – was sharply constrained, seemingly reflective of the overall
informality and politicisation of the system.
4. For example, in 2006 the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators ranked Bangladesh 204th of 212 for ‘control of
corruption’. Bangladesh has risen to 177th of 212 countries since then, surrounded almost entirely by conflict affected and
resource rich countries.
5. North et al. (2009) describe this equilibrium as a ‘double balance’.
6. As Bates (2010:755) has written of North et al.’s (2009) framework, ‘This reader, at least, is surprised by the limited role that
micro-level reasoning plays in their arguments’. Put somewhat differently, the analysis of political settlements can easily
come to imply stasis and inevitability, whereas history tells us that economic reform has frequently been punctuated by
sudden political realignment and the opening of new reform possibilities (Ascher, 1989; Bates, 1989; Grindle & Thomas,
1991; Haggard & Webb, 1993; Roe, 1994; Thirsk, 1997).
7. This is particularly appropriate in Bangladesh, as one of the exemplars of this type of approach, Mushtaq Khan (2013), has
written extensively about Bangladesh’s broader political economy.
8. Data from ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (Prichard, Cobham, & Goodall, 2014).
9. Most formal exemptions are reflected in Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs), which reveal a constantly evolving and
extensive set of exemptions and incentives, usefully summarised in Business Consulting Services (BCS, 2014). The
Government of Bangladesh estimates that formal tax exemptions and incentives amount to between 2.5 per cent and
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3 per cent of GDP (25–30% of tax collection) (Ahmed, 2011). The government has been unwilling to make more detailed
data available, while our research suggests that actual revenue foregone is substantially greater.
10. As of 2011 there were an estimated 16,000 pending cases, amounting to $1.4 Billion in ‘frozen’ revenues. In 2011, the
government introduced an ADR system for more timely out of court resolution of disputes, though these efforts remain in
their infancy and are only a very partial solution. (World Bank. Bangladeshi businesses try mediation to resolve their tax
disputes. Retrieved from https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-simplification/alternative-
dispute-resolution/bangladeshi-businesses-try-mediation-to-resolve-their-tax-disputes.cfm)
11. Major reform initiatives began with the introduction of the VAT in 1991, and have been followed by a procession of large
tax reform programmes since the late 1990s. These have included the World Bank supported ‘Customs Administration
Modernizaton’ (CAM) project, initiated in 1999, the ‘Modernization and Automation Program’ (MAP) initiated in 2005,
which was designed to achieve many of the failed goals of the CAM (Mozumder, 2012), ‘Tax Administration Modernization
Project’ (TAMP), which was cancelled owing to the poor performance of the MAP project, and the DFID funded ‘Reforms
in Revenue Administration’ (RIRA) project, which was similarly not renewed after 2008 owing to poor performance. These
are documented at greater length in Hassan and Prichard (2013).
12. This has been most systematically documented by Transparency International Bangladesh (2011) in a study that received
significant attention among public officials.
13. A remarkable 26 separate chairmen were appointed in the first 38 years of the NBR’s existence. This has reflected control of
the appointments process by the political leadership – despite legal provisions calling for internal appointment by the NBR
Board – and the repeated removal of chairmen who pursued policies that challenged the interests of the Ministry of Finance,
Prime Minister’s Office, or powerful business groups (Transparency International Bangladesh [TIB], 2011).
14. As discussed at greater length later in this paper, the government explicitly pointed to business resistance as the justification
for abandoning plans for a new VAT Law in 2011 (NBR drops plan to introduce new VAT law. 24 May 2011. Financial
Express. Retrieved from http://news.priyo.com/business/2011/05/24/nbr-drops-plan-introduce-new-v-26923.html)
15. Resistance to reform has been driven particularly by the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association
(BGMEA), Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA), and various associations of poultry
farm owners.
16. A recent estimate is that 29 owners of Ready Made Garment (RMG) companies were sitting MPs prior to the 2014 elections
(Ahmed et al., 2013).
17. This is an issue that is widely recognised in lower-income contexts, but which has not been the subject of focused academic
study. It has more commonly been noted as a feature of the exercise of political power in post-Soviet states (see, for
example, Ledeneva, 2006, pp. 91–103, 142–158)
18. As discussed in greater detail later in this paper, the years since 2009 in particular have seen a range of incremental reforms
initiated. More broadly, many NBR chairmen and ministers of finance have shown a desire to lead on reform, but have been
stifled in those efforts.
19. The Executive Associations, the BCS Customs Cadre and Excise, the Non Cadre Inspectors Association, and the Ministerial
Staff Association.
20. Similar patterns in the Bangladesh civil service have been documented by research elsewhere (CGS (Centre for Governance
Studies) and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 2006; Huque & Rahman, 2003; IGS, 2008).
21. The commonality of reform measures across lower-income countries, generally following the broader outlines of IMF
advice, has led Fjeldstad and Moore (2008, p. 236), for example, to refer to a ‘global reform programme’.
22. NBR reinstates minimum VAT payment for small shops. (8 July 2012). The Independent. Retrieved from http://news.priyo.
com/business/2012/07/08/nbr-reinstates-minim-55210.html
23. Bangladesh gets $987 million from IMF. (11 April 2012). IMF Survey Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/car041112a.htm
24. IMF won’t loosen strings on loans: the lender says it will not release the second installment of $1 billion if conditions are not
met by Nov. (11 October 2012). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-37540.html; IMF Asks
Government to Alter VAT Bill. (31 October 2012). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/
news-details.php?nid=255555
25. Of the retention of significant discretion within the NBR the IMF wrote that, ‘The fundamental features of the VAT should
be set out in law, not left to the Board (NBR) to prescribe, as this would jeopardise the stability and predictability of the tax’.
Of proposals to require firms to report input-output coefficients it wrote that, ‘effective tax agencies do not require such
burdensome calculations to facilitate the auditing of taxpayers’. Of plans to introduce a 5 per cent turnover tax as an
alternative to the standard VAT, the IMF argued that it ‘undermines the very purpose and key objectives of the new VAT by
reducing revenue, complicating administration, and severely impeding its operability’.
26. IMF okays $140 million. (22 February 2013). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/
news-details.php?nid=270006
27. NBR proposes major changes to VAT law. (6 October 2012). The Financial Express. Retrieved from http://news.priyo.com/
2012/10/06/business-61153.html
28. In late 2014, shortly before this article was finalised, the government announced its intention to make fresh amendments to
the law in the face of calls for repeal by the FBCCI, while the NBR had issued requests that implementation be delayed.
VAT Act to be amended (9 October 2014) BD News 24. Retrieved from http://bdnews24.com/economy/2014/09/10/vat-act-
to-be-amended
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29. Mass Transfer at Tax Offices. (21 January 2013). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/
news-details.php?nid=266073
30. Perhaps the most well known example is the case of Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus, who came under attack by
the government when he began to engage more actively in politics. As part of this process, senior tax officials claim that
they were asked to look into bringing a tax case against him. In the same vein, a controversial tax evasion case was brought
against Moudud Ahmed, a leader within the opposition BNP party, in early 2012.
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